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The Demandingness of Scanlon’s
Contractualism*
Elizabeth Ashford
INTRODUCTION
Utilitarianism has long faced the objection that it is unreasonably de-
manding. One of the reasons why Kantian contractualism has been seen
as an appealing alternative is that it seems to be able to avoid utilitar-
ianism’s extreme demandingness, while retaining a fully impartial moral
point of view.1 I will argue that contractualist moral obligations to help
others when their basic interests are at stake are just as demanding as
utilitarian obligations. My discussion will focus on Thomas Scanlon’s
formulation of contractualism,2 since I take it to be the most fully de-
veloped and powerful version of contractualism as an account of indi-
vidual moral obligations.
There are two main contexts in which such obligations arise. The
first context is that of emergency situations; two central features of
emergencies are that persons’ basic interests are at stake, and an agent
is in a position to give help. The term ‘emergency’ is also generally used
to refer to short-term and rare episodes. The steady state of chronic
malnutrition that kills millions each year does not count as an emer-
* I am grateful to David Archard, David Copp, Roger Crisp, James Griffin, Rahul
Kumar, Tim Mulgan, Derek Parfit, Thomas Pogge, Michael Ridge, John Skorupski, Chris-
topher R. Taylor, Leif Wenar, and two anonymous referees and the editors at Ethics for
their very helpful comments. I am especially grateful to David Copp and Derek Parfit for
their extremely extensive and astute comments on several drafts.
1. I am using the term ‘impartial’ in a substantive sense, to denote the claim that
each person’s interests have equal moral weight. I will focus on Kantian contractualism
rather than Gauthier’s alternative version of contractualism because, as Brian Barry has
forcefully argued, in Justice as Impartiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), Gau-
thier’s version does not incorporate impartiality in this substantive sense.
2. Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1999). All page numbers refer to this book unless otherwise specified.
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gency, on this usage.3 The second main context in which the obligation
to promote others’ basic interests arises is that of giving aid to those
who are in serious need as a result of extreme poverty. The demand-
ingness of utilitarian obligations toward the world’s poor has been the
primary focus of debate over the demandingness of utilitarianism and
has been widely held to cast serious doubt on the viability of the theory.4
I should emphasize that my argument that contractualist obligations
to promote others’ basic interests are just as demanding as utilitarian
ones is not intended as a criticism of Scanlon’s theory. Any plausible
moral theory must hold that there are some situations in which agents
face extreme moral demands—for example, a situation in which the
only way of stopping billions of people suffering an agonizing death
was by hacking off your left leg with a fairly blunt machete. So the fact
that a moral theory is sometimes extremely demanding is not in itself
a forceful objection to it. The important question is whether a moral
theory has a plausible account of when and why moral obligations are
extremely demanding. And there are, in fact, strong grounds for think-
ing that in the context of emergency situations, and of our current
obligations to help those in need, any impartial moral theory is liable
to be extremely demanding.
The reason that emergencies tend to be so demanding is that the
most morally salient feature of an emergency is that persons’ basic in-
terests are at stake, which means that whatever an agent who is in a
position to help does or fails to do has a drastic and irrevocable impact
on others’ interests. And this feature of emergency situations is also a
constant feature of the current state of the world: persons’ basic interests
are constantly at stake for easily preventable reasons, such as malnutri-
tion, and, given modern communications, the relatively well-off are con-
stantly in a position to help them. This accounts in turn for the extreme
demandingness of our current moral obligations to help those in need.
I will therefore be suggesting that although utilitarian obligations
to help those in need run counter to deeply held intuitions about what
it is reasonable to expect of agents, in the current state of the world it
may not be possible to defend less demanding obligations to those in
need within an impartial moral framework. The failure of Scanlon’s
contractualism to offer such a defense, when it had a particularly strong
3. I have argued elsewhere that we have reason to view the current state of the world
as a constant emergency situation (Elizabeth Ashford, “Utilitarianism, Integrity and Par-
tiality,” Journal of Philosophy 97 [2000]: 421–39). In this article, in order to avoid confusion,
I will conform to the standard use of the term ‘emergency’ as denoting a situation which
is rare and short-lived.
4. Peter Singer’s article, “Famine, Affluence and Morality” (Philosophy & Public Affairs
1 [1973]: 229–43), e.g., generated a huge amount of discussion about the viability of a
broadly utilitarian account of the demandingness of our obligations to those in need.
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prospect of doing so, suggests that such a defense cannot be given. This
implies that if we take seriously the central tenet of enlightenment moral
theory that each person has equal moral status, we may have to accept
that our current moral obligations to those in need are drastically more
demanding than our commonsense moral thinking tells us.
I will be arguing, then, that utilitarianism and contractualism can-
not be faulted for holding that our obligations toward those in extreme
need are extreme. There are, however, contexts in which utilitarianism
might implausibly require that persons should not be helped, even
though their basic interests are at stake, because those interests are
outweighed by the aggregate sum total of relatively unimportant benefits
to a large number of people. Scanlon gives the example of an electrical
worker, Jones, who is trapped by some fallen electrical equipment during
the transmission of a World Cup match watched by millions and is
receiving extremely painful electrical shocks. The only way of stopping
the shocks is to temporarily shut down the transmission of the game.
Utilitarianism might imply that the aggregate pleasure to the millions
from watching the match would outweigh the one person’s serious pain.
Scanlon tries to avoid this unacceptable implication of utilitarianism
by precluding any interpersonal aggregation of benefits and burdens.
At the core of his view is his stipulation that burdens have to be ac-
ceptable to each person, considered one by one, from that person’s
own point of view.
In the final section of this article, however, I will discuss a paradox
that follows from this stipulation, as Scanlon characterizes it, which
means that acceptable principles will remain exceedingly demanding
in any practically realizable state of the world. And while the demand-
ingness of our current contractualist obligations to help those in need
appropriately reflects morally salient features of the current state of the
world, the extreme demandingness of contractualism in any practically
realizable state of the world is, I will argue, highly implausible. By con-
trast, a credible version of utilitarianism would be considerably less de-
manding if the state of the world were relevantly different. I will there-
fore claim that insofar as the demandingness objection is forceful, it is
in one important respect a deeper problem for contractualism than for
utilitarianism, and that banning any kind of interpersonal aggregation
of benefits and burdens is not a viable response to the unacceptable
kind of aggregation which the Jones case illustrates.
I will begin by examining Scanlon’s account of contractualist moral
principles and will then argue, in the second and third sections, that
contractualism ought to accept principles governing emergencies and
helping those in need that are just as demanding as utilitarian obliga-
tions. Finally, in Section IV, I will argue that contractualist moral prin-
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ciples remain exceedingly demanding in any practically realizable state
of the world.
I. A SUMMARY OF SCANLON’S CONTRACTUALISM
According to contractualism, unlike utilitarianism, there is no obligation
for an agent to maximize overall well-being or minimize overall suffering
with each action.5 Rather, her behavior is morally acceptable if and only
if it is not prohibited by a set of moral principles for the general reg-
ulation of social behavior that no one could reasonably reject.
There are two central features of what counts as reasonable rejec-
tion. First, the only reasons for and against a principle that are eligible
for judging whether or not it can be reasonably rejected are “various
individuals’ reasons for objecting to that principle and alternatives to
it” (p. 229). Individuals must be objecting on their own behalf, and not
on behalf of a group. This restriction to single individuals’ reasons
therefore bars interpersonal aggregation of complaints. If an individual
has a reason to object to a principle, this objection will not be out-
weighed by a less strong objection held by more than one other person.
This feature of reasonable rejection is one of the key ways in which
Scanlon’s contractualism is distinguished from utilitarianism.
Second, what counts as reasonable rejection depends on the com-
parative strength of the individual’s reasons for and against the prin-
ciple. Whether a principle is rejectable depends on whether any other
individual has a better reason to reject alternative principles. The es-
sentially comparative nature of reasonable rejection, combined with the
restriction to individuals’ reasons, together entail that any individual
can reasonably reject a principle when she can propose an alternative
principle to which no other single individual has an equally strong
objection.
A primary ground for an individual to object to a principle is the
effect the implementation of a principle would have on his or her well-
being. Scanlon emphasizes that this is not the only ground for objection.
The way in which the cost to the person’s well-being is imposed may
also be a ground for reasonable rejection, if the cost would be imposed
unfairly, for example. Often, though, the gain or loss in well-being will
be the most salient consideration: “In many cases, gains and losses in
well-being (relief from suffering, for example) are clearly the most rel-
5. It is worth noting that several passages in Mill suggest that he allowed that actions
could fail to be optimific without being wrong. Several passages also suggest that he
generally reserved the concept of an obligation (which he connected with the concept
of blameworthiness) to actions that affect only central aspects of persons’ well-being. In
both respects I think that Mill’s formulation is more plausible than many modern for-
mulations of utilitarianism.
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evant factors in determining whether a principle could or could not be
reasonably rejected” (p. 215).
An important question in understanding Scanlon’s account of rea-
sonable rejection is whether, on those occasions when the cost to well-
being is the most salient consideration, the assessment of principles
primarily involves comparing the gains and losses in well-being to the
various individuals involved.6 On this interpretation, the weighing of
different persons’ interests will, as with utilitarianism, play a central role
in the assessment of candidate principles, the two main differences
between the theories being, first, that contractualism denies that gains
and losses in well-being are the only morally relevant considerations
and, second, that it denies that they should ever be interpersonally
aggregated.
It might be thought that Scanlon avoids such direct weighing of
different individuals’ burdens; this reading might be thought to be sug-
gested by his stipulation that in assessing principles, we do not consider
the complaints of specific fully situated individuals, but have to appeal
to more abstract, generic standpoints. However, in appealing to generic
standpoints, Scanlon is not most plausibly interpreted as denying that
what matter in the assessment of candidate principles are the complaints
raised by particular individuals. Such a denial would be in tension with
the core of his contractualism, which is that acceptable principles must
be justifiable to each individual affected by them.
There are two main reasons for the introduction of generic reasons.
The first reason is to rule out appeals to interests that ought not to be
taken into account. Scanlon argues that the “intuitive” notion of well-
being, denoting the “quality of life for the person who lives it” (p. 112),
is not to be straightforwardly identified with the notion that is legiti-
mately employed in moral argument. Scanlon says little about the le-
gitimate appeal to well-being, but his most specific suggestion is that it
“can appeal to more specific forms of opportunity, assistance, and for-
bearance that we all have reason to want” (p. 140). The introduction
of generic reasons, which are not based on individuals’ particular pref-
erences but on what people have reason to want “in virtue of their
situation, characterised in general terms” (p. 204), ensures that com-
plaints that are based on costs to well-being appeal only to interests that
everyone has reason to be concerned with.
In the context of evaluating principles of aid, the gains and losses
in well-being at stake for the individuals involved are very serious and
6. Scanlon holds that an agent’s complaint against a principle depends both on the
burden the principle would impose on her (i.e., the amount by which she would be worse
off under acceptance of that principle than under acceptance of some alternative) and
on her absolute level of well-being.
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are clearly ones that everyone has reason to want or avoid, respectively.
Those burdened by the principles (those giving the aid) will be ap-
pealing to important costs to well-being which anyone in the position
of agent has reason to avoid. And the potential beneficiaries of the
principles of aid will undoubtedly be appealing to “specific forms of
assistance . . . we all have reason to want” (p. 140), since the burden
of not being helped will be something that is of universal human sig-
nificance, such as the loss of life or limb, or the preventable death of
one’s child. Therefore, any differences between the notion of well-being
that utilitarianism applies and the notion to which Scanlon is appealing
are not relevant in comparing utilitarian and contractualist accounts of
obligations to assist others’ basic interests.7
The other main rationale behind the appeal to generic reasons and
standpoints is that in assessing principles for the general regulation of
behavior, the costs that need to be taken into consideration go beyond
the consequences of the particular action(s) we might be concerned
with. First, “widespread performance of acts of a given kind can have
very different effects from isolated individual instances” (p. 203). Sec-
ond, principles may impose constraints on the kinds of reasons that
agents may or must take into consideration. This will have an impact
on their freedom to plan and organize their lives. It may also impinge
on their personal relationships. Constraints on acceptable reasons may
also have important benefits for other individuals, since they enable
mutual expectations to be established; Scanlon gives the example of
privacy, which requires assurance that other people will not intrude in
various ways, in addition to their refraining from actually doing so.
When we assess these broader costs and benefits in evaluating a
principle, we cannot know in advance which particular individuals will
be affected in various ways. We therefore have to appeal to reasons that
we can reasonably expect whoever it is that turns out to be affected by
the principle in a certain way to invoke. These reasons are called “ge-
neric” because they are based not on the unique interests and char-
7. In addition, in some cases the move to generic reasons is made because of disa-
greement about the standard of value to be used in making complaints about proposed
principles. For example, one party may want to reject a principle because it hinders the
practice of her particular religion, while another party does not recognize the truth of
that religion and consequently discounts the burden. The two parties are at an impasse
in considering the principle. Here, the move to generic reasons is justified by the general
imperative for reasonable agreement. The two parties must abstract to a higher level to
a category of burden they can agree on. They may agree on something like the general
category of “religion,” or even “questions of cosmic importance.” (I am grateful to Leif
Wenar for pointing this out to me.) Again, though, in the context of evaluating principles
of aid, the burdens both parties invoke in their objections to alternative principles are
uncontroversial.
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acteristics of particular individuals but on “commonly available infor-
mation about what people have reason to want” (p. 204). These generic
reasons still represent the reasons that particular individuals affected in
various ways by the proposed principles will appeal to. The reason they
are not based on those individuals’ personal tastes and other charac-
teristics unique to themselves is because of the epistemic consideration
that we do not know in advance who those individuals will be. We there-
fore need to look at reasons that we think those individuals who do
actually end up being affected in the various ways, whoever they turn
out to be, will appeal to.
Generic reasons are, therefore, invoked in order to compare the
strength of different individuals’ objections to proposed principles, first,
because certain kinds of costs and benefits are ones that everyone has
reason to avoid or want and, second, because we cannot always know
the specific ways in which various individuals will be affected. When the
generic reasons are primarily grounded in appeals to costs to well-being
that are clearly of universal human importance, the assessment of the
comparative strength of individuals’ objections to various proposed prin-
ciples will centrally involve comparing the immediate and long-term
gains and losses to their well-being.
It is particularly important to emphasize that Scanlon rejects the
idea that there is a threshold level of cost, “such that it is reasonable
to reject any principle that would lead to one’s suffering a cost that
great” (p. 196). This follows from the essentially comparative nature of
reasonable rejection. However great is the cost to an agent of her com-
pliance with a principle, she cannot reasonably reject the principle on
the basis of appealing to this cost alone, given that all the alternative
principles may impose an even greater cost on other individuals.
Scanlon’s contractualism differs in this respect from Thomas Na-
gel’s version of contractualism. When Nagel discusses the demanding-
ness of a principle governing giving aid to those in need, he says that
when the principles reach a certain level of demandingness, those giving
the aid can reasonably reject the demanding principle, even though
those in need can also reasonably reject a less demanding principle.8
(It should be emphasized, however, that although Nagel is denying that
it is unreasonable for those giving aid to reject the hugely demanding
principle, he is also denying that their behavior conforms to the con-
tractualist goal of acting in a way that is justifiable to each person. Nagel
holds that in this situation it may not be possible to find an acceptable
principle of aid, since, within a certain range of demandingness, any
candidate principle can be “reasonably rejected either from the point
8. Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991),
pp. 48–51.
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of view of the needy, as insufficiently generous, or from the point of
view of the well-off, as too demanding.”)9
According to Scanlon, by contrast, what counts as reasonable is
determined solely by the goal of finding principles that no one can
reasonably reject. This means that if other individuals have better reason
to reject all the alternative principles, we cannot reasonably reject a
principle purely because of the burden it imposes on us. We converge
on a principle that no one can reasonably reject when the individually
strongest objection to it is as small as possible. I will now turn to the
question of the demandingness of contractualist principles governing
emergencies and helping those in need.
II. THE DEMANDINGNESS OF CONTRACTUALISM
IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
One important difference between Scanlon’s contractualism and utili-
tarianism is that, since Scanlon does not allow the interpersonal aggre-
gation of complaints in assessing the magnitude of the strongest objec-
tion to a principle, the demandingness of an agent’s moral obligations
is not contingent on the number of people whose interests are threat-
ened. Unlike utilitarianism, therefore, contractualism will not hold that
the agent is, for example, ceteris paribus required to sacrifice her own
life in order to save the lives of several others. Nevertheless, as I will
now argue, contractualism holds that the agent is not permitted to give
special weight even to her own central interests in an emergency and
that she is likely to be required to sacrifice them.
A primary ground an individual may have for objecting to a pro-
posed principle governing emergencies is the cost the principle would
impose on her well-being. Scanlon, as we have seen, argues that in many
cases, gains and losses in well-being are the most morally salient con-
sideration, and these cases will most obviously include those in which
persons’ basic interests are at stake. In such cases, what the agent does
on this one occasion will have a drastic and irrevocable impact on others’
well-being. It may determine whether there will be any future at all for
certain individuals, if their lives are at stake, or whether the rest of their
lives will be marred by their child’s death, and so on. This means that
the complaints raised by other individuals regarding the consequences
that an agent’s actions under a principle could have for them are po-
tentially very strong. Moreover, agents are unlikely to encounter more
than a few emergency situations in their lifetime where a plausible prin-
ciple governing emergencies would require them to act, which means
that such a principle is unlikely to impose a long-term cumulative cost
on an agent over her life as a whole. This suggests that the comparison
9. Ibid., p. 50.
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of various individuals’ objections to proposed principles governing
emergency situations will principally involve comparing the costs and
benefits to each individual imposed by the particular actions that an
agent may be required to perform by those principles.
This interpretation fits Scanlon’s discussion of the case involving
two swimmers struggling for the one remaining life jacket (pp. 195–96).
In his assessment of the relevant principle, Scanlon focuses on the im-
mediate costs to the interests of each of the swimmers imposed by the
things each agent might do. This is presumably because what the agents
do on this one occasion determines whether one of them will stay alive.
In this context, any wider ramifications of the principle’s long-term cost
over the agents’ lifetimes are not morally salient.
Given the comparative nature of reasonable rejection, there is no
limit to the extent of the sacrifice a justified principle may require of
an agent provided that a single other individual has an equally strong
or stronger objection to all the alternative principles, and in an emer-
gency, the agent’s complaint over even the loss of her vital interests is
likely to be balanced or outweighed by an equally great or greater cost
to another individual. Scanlon stipulates that neither swimmer in the
life jacket example can legitimately give more weight to the cost to
himself of his own death than the cost to the other swimmer of dying.
Like utilitarianism, therefore, contractualism does not give the agent
dispensation to give special weight to his own vital interests, even when
the other individuals involved are complete strangers.
Unlike utilitarianism, however, contractualism holds that the future
expected cost to the various individuals involved is not the only morally
relevant consideration. In the life jacket example, Scanlon mentions
that it may make a difference if one of the swimmers has struggled hard
to find the life jacket. But notice that this additional consideration does
not ground an agent-relative principle permitting an agent to give spe-
cial weight to his own interests. Rather, it gives the swimmer who worked
hard to find the life jacket an additional ground for complaint against
any principle that would not give him priority in claiming the life jacket.
It actually makes it impermissible for the agent who did not originally
find the life jacket to struggle now to take it away from the other swim-
mer, which means that the only permissible course of action open to
him will lead to his certain death.
In a situation in which the two swimmers’ objections are evenly
balanced, such as when “they arrive at the life jacket at the same mo-
ment,” the nonrejectable principle is one that is capable of “recognizing
the symmetry of their claims and the need for some decisive solution”
(p. 196). This will be the principle that, of those available, comes closest
to giving each of the two swimmers an equal chance of survival. The
ideal principle, if it were feasible, would be to draw lots.
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Like utilitarianism, therefore, contractualism may require agents to
sacrifice their own vital interests for the sake of a stranger in emergency
situations. It can be argued, however, that Scanlon’s theory, unlike util-
itarianism, might draw a sharp distinction between the obligation to
save another person’s vital interests and the obligation not to harm
another’s vital interests and hold that the former is considerably less
stringent. The reason the obligation not to grab the life jacket is so
demanding might be, therefore, that it should be seen as an obligation
not to harm another’s vital interests.
Indeed, a fully impartial principle might be universally agreed to
in advance according to which it is supererogatory rather than obligatory
for an agent to make a very serious personal sacrifice in order to save
another person’s vital interests, even though general compliance with
this principle might impose on some individuals the burden of prev-
entable death. If individuals were solely concerned to maximize their
chances of survival, they might have no reason to accept such a principle
rather than a principle requiring help. However, there might be other
considerations that each individual could reasonably hold to outweigh
the concern to maximize the chances of survival.
Individuals arguably would have reason, for example, to give special
weight to the extreme demandingness of a requirement to sacrifice
central interests in order to help a stranger, given how psychologically
difficult it would be to do so. (By contrast, a stringent obligation not
to harm a stranger’s vital interests to save one’s own central interests
could be viewed as less demanding, given that harming generally has a
much greater psychological impact on agents than failing to help.) Each
individual might judge the demandingness of a requirement to make
a great personal sacrifice, were they to be in the position of the agent,
to outweigh the cost of certain death, were they to be in the position
of the person whose vital interests are threatened, and so they might
each favor a principle of supererogation. Another consideration might
be that such a requirement would seriously impinge on the control
agents have over the course of their lives, to a much greater extent than
the obligation not to harm others’ vital interests.10
Given these kinds of considerations, each individual might agree
to a principle according to which it is supererogatory rather than oblig-
atory to make a very serious personal sacrifice in order to give help in
emergency cases. It should be emphasized, however, that the contexts
in which each person might agree to such a principle are limited to
those in which each person assesses principles for emergency situations
in advance of actually being in an emergency and, moreover, in which
10. See Rahul Kumar, “Defending the Moral Moderate: Contractualism and Common
Sense,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 28 (1999): 275–309, p. 300.
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each person has a random chance of ending up either as the party
whose vital interests are at stake or as the agent in a position to help
them at a very serious personal cost. In such contexts, each person is
just as likely to be benefited as burdened by the principle. In addition,
the likelihood of being burdened by it, by being allowed to die, for
example, is fairly remote, which is why each person’s concern to max-
imize his or her chances of survival may be outweighed by other con-
siderations. Each person might therefore agree to bearing the remote
potential burden of being allowed to die, in order to avoid the burdens
imposed on agents by a more demanding principle.
By contrast, in contexts in which it is known in advance that in-
dividuals who belong to a particular identifiable group are certain to
die (or are at a particularly great risk of death) unless they are helped,
these individuals would be severely burdened by general acceptance of
the principle of supererogation rather than a principle requiring help,
since this would impose on them the burden of probable death. In this
context, individuals are not all in a relevantly similar position when they
consider candidate principles of aid. For those individuals who are al-
most certain to die unless they are helped, the concern to improve their
chances of survival is likely to be paramount. They have an extremely
strong objection to the principle of supererogation, which outweighs
other individuals’ objections to any stronger principle that required
what the principle of supererogation merely says to be praiseworthy. In
such contexts, the principle of supererogation can reasonably be re-
jected by the parties who are at risk.
This can be illustrated by considering the example of the sinking
Titanic. Notoriously, a hugely disproportionate number of survivors were
first-class passengers. Let us assume that possession of a first-class ticket
granted the passenger access to one of the lifeboats. These passengers
would then be in a position to help some of the third-class passengers
by choosing to offer up their place on board a lifeboat or by trying to
get more passengers on board the lifeboats at an increased risk of cap-
sizing. A principle according to which it would be supererogatory for
them to give the help could have been reasonably rejected by the third-
class passengers, since acceptance of it would lead to their almost certain
deaths.
This means that a principle according to which it is supererogatory
to make a very serious sacrifice to help those whose vital interests are
threatened will not be relevant to the context to which I will now turn,
concerning the obligation for relatively affluent agents to give aid to
those whose vital interests are threatened by chronic poverty. In this
context we know that those whose vital interests are threatened, like
the third-class passengers on the Titanic, had no chance of avoiding
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the threat. Unless they are helped, they face likely death from the
outset.11
III. THE DEMANDINGNESS OF CONTRACTUALIST
OBLIGATIONS TO HELP THOSE IN NEED
The first question to consider in assessing the demandingness of con-
tractualist obligations to help those in need is whether the evaluation
of principles takes into account circumstances of minimal compliance.
Scanlon does not address this question. He describes contractualist prin-
ciples as being “for the general regulation of behavior” (p. 153) and
presumably has situations of widespread compliance primarily in mind.
However, general regulation does not entail general compliance. Prin-
ciples for the general regulation of behavior are, strictly, principles that
apply to everyone, even if there is no guarantee that everyone conforms
to them. So a principle that requires each agent to help others when
their basic interests are at stake and, in deciding how many people to
help, to take into consideration how much help other agents are giving,
could be a principle for the general regulation of behavior—even if
most agents give no help at all.
The most important implication of the idea that the principles in
question are “for the general regulation of behavior” is that in assessing
candidate principles, we need to consider the overall effect that their
acceptance would have on the general character of the social world. In
evaluating principles, therefore, we are asked to consider any objections
that could arise in the social world in which the principle is adopted,
rather than limiting ourselves to considering only objections to partic-
ular actions the principle permits or requires, considered in isolation.
This leaves open, however, whether or not we are supposed to make
realistic assumptions about the extent to which a principle would ac-
tually be complied with. One option is that we should imagine an ide-
alized, fictional world, in which compliance with candidate principles
is more widespread than it is likely to be in reality, and examine the
various objections to principles that would arise in that hypothetical
world. Another option, however, is that the characterization of the social
world should include the extent of actual or likely conformity with
principles.12 The objections to principles raised in realistic and idealized
11. While there are, of course, significant differences between the Titanic case and
the case of obligations of relatively affluent agents toward the chronically poor, one parallel
between them is that money can, like a first-class ticket, purchase the means of survival,
while, conversely, lack of money can, like possessing a third-class ticket, mean that someone
is unable to secure access to these means. In addition, the chronically poor have no less
moral entitlement to the means of survival than did the third-class passengers.
12. See Thomas Pogge, “What We Can Reasonably Reject,” Nouˆs/Philosophical Issues
11 (2001): 118–47, p. 132.
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social worlds may vary considerably. As I will now argue, it is only if
candidate principles are tempered to the actual world in which we live,
and assessed under realistic assumptions about the extent to which they
actually are or would be complied with, that all the complaints arising
from the way in which individuals would actually be affected by various
principles can be adequately addressed.
Since Scanlon does not explicitly discuss situations of minimal com-
pliance, I will examine what I take it that he ought to say about such
situations, given his account of reasonable rejection. It is likely that there
is a principle of aid that, if it were generally followed, would ensure
that those in need could expect to be helped, without imposing huge
demands on agents.13 Let me speak of the “Principle of Aid.” It is plau-
sible that such a principle could not reasonably be rejected, given the
assumption of general compliance. However, even if an agent does her
fair share under the Principle of Aid, if she acts in circumstances, such
as actually obtain, in which most relatively affluent agents give no aid
at all, there will be many individuals in desperate need whom she could
have helped but fails to help. It is clear on Scanlon’s view that, in order
for the agent to be able to justify her behavior to these individuals, she
must be able to say that her failure to help them is permitted by some
principle that they could not reasonably reject. The question, then, is
whether these individuals whom the agent fails to help can reasonably
object to the Principle of Aid on the ground that it does not require
enough of agents who are willing to help, given that most people are
not willing to help.
At the core of Scanlon’s contractualism is the view that acceptable
moral principles must be justifiable to each individual who is burdened
by them from that individual’s own standpoint. One of Scanlon’s main
claims is that we cannot invoke a veil of ignorance. When our act would
impose a great burden on someone, we must be able to argue that our
act is permitted by some principle that this person could not reasonably
reject, even given full knowledge of the burden that she would have to
bear. The problem with acting on a principle that might be justified on
the fictional assumption of general compliance when we are actually in
circumstances of minimal compliance is that this fails to address the
13. Given the enormity of the current disparity in wealth, a very small redistribution
of wealth from the relatively affluent to the poorest quarter of the world’s population
would enable the chronic poverty that currently threatens persons’ basic interests to be
removed. The international poverty line, below which “a minimum, nutritionally adequate
diet plus essential non-food requirements are not affordable” (United Nations Development
Program: Human Development Report, 1996 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1996], p.
222) and below which 1.5 billion fall, is currently specified at an annual per capita income
of $394 at purchasing power parity 1993.
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actual case at hand and to acknowledge the burden that particular
individuals actually face.
This can be illustrated by considering an example in which there
are ten children drowning in a pond and five agents on the scene who
could rescue them. Let us suppose that the water is very cold, and that
the agent’s burden of rescuing the children therefore increases as the
number of children she rescues increases, since it becomes increasingly
unpleasant to remain in the water. The relevant general principle that
could not reasonably be rejected, assuming general compliance, is that
in such circumstances the burden of rescue should be evenly distributed
among the agents on the scene. However, if the other bystanders left
the scene, and the agent were to walk off after rescuing only two chil-
dren, on the ground that this complies with the principle that if everyone
else also complied with it, could not reasonably be rejected, it is hard
to see how this could be justified to those left to drown.
There are several differences between the pond case and the case
of obligations to help those whose interests are threatened by chronic
poverty, but one important parallel is that, in both, minimal compliance
with a principle of aid that would otherwise be justified under Scanlon’s
theory leads to some individuals’ vital interests being threatened. The
complaint such burdens give rise to can be acknowledged only if the
extent to which the principle is actually complied with is taken into
consideration.
Individuals in need can therefore point out that principles can
reasonably be rejected if they do not cover—in a way that cannot rea-
sonably be rejected—cases in which there is minimal compliance with
them. They can reasonably reject principles on grounds of complaints
they would have in such situations, since that is the situation they are
actually in, one in which, because other potential rescuers are not acting
as they should, they are about to bear a great burden.
As I will later argue, the circumstance of minimal compliance also
gives rise to a complaint on the part of those giving help against very
demanding principles of aid, namely, that it is unfair for them to have
to pick up the tab for others’ failure to give any help at all. But this
very complaint is likewise premised on taking the situation of minimal
compliance into consideration, in deciding what principles can reason-
ably be rejected, rather than simply defining the general principles in
terms of reasonable acceptance under the assumption of general
compliance.
Scanlon’s own discussion of the “Rescue Principle” (p. 224) is rel-
evant here. This principle claims that if we can prevent something very
bad from happening to someone by making a slight or even a moderate
sacrifice, it would be wrong not to do so. This principle clearly applies
to all cases in which someone is in desperate need and could be helped
Ashford Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism 287
at only a moderate cost. It would still apply even if the rescuer and the
person in need were the only two people in the world who took morality
seriously.14 It should moreover be stressed that the principle is just as
applicable to the obligation to help the chronically poor as to the ob-
ligation to respond to short-term emergencies such as in the pond case,
since in both cases the individuals who need help are in dire straits.
When Scanlon suggests restrictions on this principle, they are en-
tirely about whether the rescuer would be required to help at too great
a cost to herself. This is the issue to which I will now turn. I will argue
that there is, in fact, a principle of aid that cannot be reasonably rejected
which is far more demanding than the Rescue Principle and comparable
with the demandingness of utilitarian obligations toward those in need.
(It should be noted that Scanlon leaves open the possibility that the
Rescue Principle “may not exhaust our duty to aid others when we can”
[p. 224].)
This brings us to the question of the demandingness of contrac-
tualist principles governing the obligation faced by relatively affluent
agents to give aid to those in need in circumstances, such as the present,
in which most of those who are relatively affluent give no aid at all. On
Scanlon’s account of reasonable rejection of principles, whether or not
candidate principles of aid are rejectable will depend on the comparative
strength of the agent’s objection to a demanding principle of aid and
any other individual’s objection to a less demanding principle. I will
focus first on the relatively affluent agent’s objection to a very de-
manding principle. One such principle would require her to give most
of her income to aid agencies and to spend a lot of her spare time on
campaigning and fund-raising. Let me call this the “Stringent Principle.”
Her most obvious objection to the principle will be based on the
cost it would impose on her. An important difference between this
principle and the one governing the pond example and emergency
situations in general is that the threat to persons’ vital interests resulting
from malnutrition and preventable disease is a constant problem. In
considering the general costs of the Stringent Principle across the
agent’s lifetime, therefore, we need to take into consideration the long-
term cumulative burden of repeated actions of giving help. This will
include the severe constraints the principle imposes on the amount of
time and money she is permitted to spend on her personal projects and
commitments. For example, the required political campaigning and
fund-raising would cut down on the amount of time she could spend
with her friends and family, and on her hobbies.
These are the kinds of costs to which the agent can appeal in
14. I owe this point to Derek Parfit. My discussion of minimal compliance is particularly
indebted to him and to David Copp.
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objecting to the Stringent Principle. Whether these costs justify the
agent’s rejecting the Stringent Principle depends on whether any other
individual has a greater complaint against a less demanding principle,
such as the Rescue Principle. In the current state of the world, there
are constantly individuals in need whom a relatively affluent agent is in
a position to help. Therefore, if the agent complies with all but the
most demanding principle, there will be individuals in need whom she
fails to help and whom she could help if she made a more substantial
sacrifice. These individuals can object to the Rescue Principle and pro-
pose a much more demanding alternative principle.
Scanlon describes those in need as “in dire straits: their lives are
immediately threatened, for example, or they are starving, or in great
pain, or living in conditions of bare subsistence” (p. 224). Clearly, the
sacrifice imposed on an agent by a principle of aid to those in need
will have to be extreme before it balances the cost faced by individuals
in dire straits who are not helped and otherwise would have been.
Therefore, the cost to an agent imposed by all but exceedingly de-
manding principles of aid will be outweighed by the cost to individuals
in need imposed by less demanding principles of aid. Consideration of
the comparative strengths of the burdens faced by various individuals,
then, will lead to nonrejectable principles of aid that will impose de-
mands on the agent which could be and are likely to be just as extensive
as those imposed by utilitarianism.
The agent may also object to a highly onerous principle not only
on the basis of the cost to herself but in addition on the basis of its
impact on her special obligations to particular individuals, such as her
children. The Stringent Principle may preclude her from being able to
give her children as good a start in life as she would like. Giving away
a lot of her income to help those in need might, for example, mean
that she could not afford to live in an area with good state schools or
to send her children to private schools.
She might argue that her complaint appeals to a generic objection
that everyone in the position of agent has, namely, an objection to being
prevented from giving one’s own children a good start in life. She might
then argue that each person therefore has reason to reject a principle
that prevents her from giving her children a good start in life. And
since each person has reason to reject such a principle, it can be rea-
sonably rejected. This rejection is fully impartial, since “what is appealed
to is . . . the generic reasons that everyone in the position of an agent
has for not wanting to be bound, in general, by such a strict require-
ment” (p. 225).
However, it cannot be inferred from the rejection of a principle
that prevents parents from giving their children a good start in life that
the agent can reasonably reject a hugely demanding principle of aid
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such as the Stringent Principle. Many of those in desperate straits whom
she could be helping are very unsure about whether their children will
survive into adulthood at all. They are unable to help their children to
the point of being powerless to prevent their deaths by malnutrition or
disease. They are therefore appealing to a generic reason of the very
same kind, to give their children a good start in life, but which has a
far greater urgency. Although the agent’s worry about not being able
to give her children as good a start in life as she would like is a very
strong one, she cannot legitimately give it more weight than the com-
plaint of other parents that they are unable to secure their children’s
survival. To do so would involve a failure “to recognise the force of
similar objections by others” (p. 171).
Another objection that a relatively affluent agent can propose to a
principle more stringent than the Rescue Principle, which has consid-
erable initial intuitive force, is the complaint that it is unfair for her to
face a huge burden of giving help because of others’ failure to give any
help at all. One way of understanding the unfairness objection is to see
it as arising from a conception of benevolence as a collective enterprise.15
On this picture, meeting the requirement to help others is a collective
project, and each individual is required to do only her fair share of
discharging the collective requirement. Scanlon, however, offers a com-
pelling account of the foundation of agents’ obligations to those in
need according to which the primary principle of benevolence is not a
cooperative but an individual one.
Scanlon emphasizes that the part of morality with which his theory
is concerned is not limited to “those . . . with whom it is advantageous
for us to enter into a system of mutual restraint and cooperation” (p.
179). Its scope is therefore not restricted to a set of reciprocal principles
governing the conduct of members of an association or community. The
relation that is important to morality is not mutual advantage but that
of being able to justify one’s actions to others on grounds they could
not reasonably reject. Its scope will therefore “include those beings to
whom we have good reason to want our actions to be justifiable” (p.
179). In the case of obligations to those in need, the relevant principle
of beneficence is, as Scanlon forcefully argues, most plausibly taken to
be grounded purely in the fact that failing to give any help when others’
basic interests are threatened cannot be justified to those individuals
(regardless of whether or not the agent has entered into reciprocal
relations with them).
If the basis of the principle is that the agent’s failing to help others’
15. This conception is described by Liam Murphy in “The Demands of Beneficence,”
Philosophy & Public Affairs 22 (1993): 267–92, and in his Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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basic interests cannot be justified to those individuals, then their inter-
ests provide the agent directly with reasons for giving help. This contrasts
with the cooperative principle of beneficence, according to which the
agent is not required to respond to the others’ interests directly. The
contrast can be brought out by returning to the case in which there are
ten children drowning in a pond and five agents able to rescue them,
four of whom walk off without rescuing any of the children. If the
cooperative principle is applied to this case, the agent who remains on
the scene is required to rescue only two of the children. The interests
of the other eight children belong to a pool of interests, which the agent
addresses only as a member of a group of potential beneficiaries. The
extent of the agent’s obligation depends solely on what would be the
fair division of the burden of giving help among those beneficiaries. If,
on the other hand, the children’s interests provide the agent directly
with reasons for acting, then she has an obligation toward the other
eight children, which is not removed by the fact that the cause of their
being in dire straits is others’ failure to give any help at all.16
Nevertheless, although on Scanlon’s view the primary obligation of
benevolence is an individual one, it does plausibly give rise to a sec-
ondary cooperative principle of benevolence.17 One reason for this is
that a scheme of cooperation will be the most efficient way for agents
to succeed at helping the severely needy; agents will therefore agree to
a secondary cooperative principle of benevolence as being the best way
for them to succeed in implementing their individual obligations to
those in need. But an additional reason for the cooperative scheme is
that it is the fairest way of distributing the burden of giving help among
those in a position to do so. Those relatively affluent agents who fail to
give any help are not doing their fair share (I will call them the
“slackers”).
However, since the primary and underlying principle of benevo-
16. Advocates of the cooperative principle of beneficence may argue for a distinction
between the pond case and the case of obligations to those in need, and hold that a direct
principle of rescue applies to the former, while the cooperative principle applies to the
latter. They may argue that emergency situations such as the pond case are too rare to
be thought of as a matter of collective action, and that for this reason, the burden of
rescue is one that an individual agent has to bear by herself, but that by contrast, since
the claims of the global poor will be a standing fact throughout our lives, the burden of
alleviating their plight is most plausibly viewed as a problem to be tackled collectively. As
we have seen, however, the purview of Scanlon’s Rescue Principle is not confined to short-
term emergency episodes, because it is grounded simply on the importance of the interests
at stake and the unjustifiability of failing to help them. The reason it is wrong not to save
the remaining eight drowning children is because they are in dire straits, and those whose
vital interests are threatened by chronic poverty are in equally dire straits.
17. For a full discussion of this point, see Garrett Cullity, The Moral Demands of Affluence
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, in press).
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lence is an individual one, the agent’s complaint that the slackers are
acting unfairly is unlikely to be relevant to the demandingness of her
obligations to those in need. The conscientious agent’s complaint at
being faced with an obligation to make extreme sacrifices to help those
in need as a result of others’ failure to give any help at all has consid-
erable force when it is directed at the slackers. It may well legitimate
her exerting pressure on the slackers to perform their fair share of the
burden of giving help, when she is in a position to do so. This indicates
that a principle that compels compliance with an equitable distribution
of the burden of giving aid, through a system of state taxation to fund
aid to poor countries, cannot be reasonably rejected.18 Until such a
system of taxation is in place, however, individual agents have to address
the question of how much aid they should give, given others’ failure to
give any aid at all. In this context, if the agent refused to give more
than her fair share of aid, this would be unlikely to ensure that the
burden of giving aid was fairly shared. Rather, it is highly likely that the
agent’s refusal to give more than her fair share of help would have no
impact on the slackers and would have a drastic impact on certain
individuals in desperate straits who would not be helped and otherwise
would have been. Those in need are clearly not the ones who are acting
unfairly, but it is they who would suffer if she let her complaint against
the slackers determine the amount of aid she gave.
There is also, I suggest, another respect in which the slackers can
be held to be acting unfairly. This can be seen as deriving from the
basic intuition that fairness requires that no one lacks an equal oppor-
tunity for a decent life because of morally arbitrary factors. The slackers
have had considerable opportunities largely through pure good luck
and are failing to do anything to remedy the situation in which other
individuals have no chance of a decent life simply because of where
they were born. The slackers can therefore be accused of taking unfair
advantage of their morally arbitrary good luck and giving inordinate
priority to their own interests.
The conscientious agent’s complaint at the unfairness of her on-
erous obligation to give help under the Stringent Principle may involve
an objection to the gratuity of her predicament; she is being morally
obliged to sacrifice core components of her well-being, as the result of
others’ lavishing money on trivial items that are completely inessential
18. Another institutional measure that Kantian contractualism would require would,
of course, be to end those practices which actively harm the vital interests of unprivileged
members of poor countries. Among such practices are the unfair trade laws that result
from the greater bargaining power of richer countries and the international borrowing
and resource privileges. See Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2002).
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to their well-being. It is worth emphasizing, though, that the gratuity
objection is even stronger in the case of those in dire straits. Many, for
example, lack the ten dollars needed for a simple cure for an eye disease
that will, if untreated, cause immense pain, blindness, and eventual
death. Others have to see their children die through lack of food.
I conclude that the consideration of the comparative strength of
the objections to principles governing obligations to help those in need,
by those who will benefit and those who will be burdened by such
principles, leads to an exceedingly demanding principle of aid that
cannot reasonably be rejected. The demands such principles place on
agents are comparable to those imposed by utilitarian obligations to
help those in need.
The extreme demandingness of both contractualist and utilitarian
obligations to those in need is not an objection to either view, I suggest,
but an appropriate response to morally salient features of the current
state of the world. In our world, we would expect any theory grounded
on the claim that each person has equal moral status to hold that agents
have extremely demanding obligations to give aid. The extreme de-
mandingness of utilitarian obligations to give aid arises from the vast
scale of extreme and easily preventable suffering.19 The extreme de-
19. This claim about the extreme demandingness of utilitarian obligations to help those
in need applies only to direct versions of utilitarianism, such as act utilitarianism. According
to rule utilitarianism, by contrast, the right action is the action which conforms to the right
rule, where the right rule is defined as the rule the general acceptance of which would
promote the most welfare. It follows that according to rule utilitarianism, the right action
in circumstances of minimal compliance with the rule is no more demanding than is the
right action in circumstances of general compliance. However, just as, I have argued, a version
of Kantian contractualism that fails to take into account the circumstance of minimal com-
pliance departs from the core of the theory, in the same way, I suggest, rule utilitarianism
departs from the core of utilitarianism, namely, the goal of maximizing overall welfare. This
can be illustrated by returning once more to the pond example. Rule utilitarianismprescribes
complying with a rule the general acceptance of which would maximize overall welfare, even
when the agent knows that complying with the rule will have disastrous consequences for
persons’ welfare, given the actual circumstance of minimal compliance with the rule. Rule
utilitarians may respond to such cases by including a catastrophe clause, according to which
the agent ought not to comply with the right rule (defined on the assumption of general
compliance) in circumstances in which doing so would have catastrophic consequences.
(See, e.g., Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World [Oxford: Clarendon, 2000], pp. 98–99 and
164–65. I should note that Hooker is a rule consequentialist rather than a rule utilitarian;
but the distinction is not relevant to this argument.) This is a move closer toward act utili-
tarianism, and as rule utilitarianism is modified in this way, it will correspondingly become
increasingly demanding. And the more of these actual consequences of agents’ actions with
which rule utilitarianism is concerned, the more it will have to take minimal compliance
into consideration. Moreover, death by starvation is just as serious as death by drowning.
This implies that in the current state of the world, in which there is constant catastrophic
death by starvation, there will be little difference between the demandingness of act utili-
tarianism and rule utilitarianism. Alternatively, if rule utilitarianism does ignore the actual
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mandingness of contractualist obligations to give aid arises from the
combination of the drastic and irrevocable impact on others of not being
helped with the fact that there are constantly so many in this position
that the long-term cost of giving help soon becomes extremely high.
Thus, whether we understand impartiality along utilitarian or Kantian
lines, and take the moral point of view to be founded on equal concern
or equal respect, we reach the same conclusion concerning the de-
mandingness of obligations of aid.20 It can plausibly be claimed that
both utilitarian and Kantian contractualist obligations to those in need
would be considerably less demanding if the state of the world were
relevantly different.21
I will now, however, in the final section, examine the way in which
a central feature of reasonable rejection means that contractualism
would remain exceedingly demanding in any practically realizable state
of the world. And while its demandingness in the current state of the
world is an appropriate response to the current state of the world, its
extreme demandingness in any practically realizable state of the world
is, I will argue, highly implausible. Moreover, what leads to this extreme
demandingness is a central aspect of its wholesale rejection of the in-
terpersonal aggregation of complaints, which is one of the chief ways
in which it is differentiated from utilitarianism.
catastrophic consequences resulting from ignoring the circumstance of minimal compliance,
this will be in strong conflict with the goal of maximizing overall welfare.
20. It is, of course, possible that there is an alternative conception of impartiality
according to which moral obligations to those in need would be less demanding. However,
the utilitarian and Kantian conceptions of impartiality both have considerable pull, as
responses to the two features of persons that most obviously ground their equal moral
status: their capacity for well-being and suffering, and their rational autonomy, respectively.
21. Under a more just social and political system, first, persons’ vital interests would,
on all but exceptional occasions, be taken care of at the political level, which would mean
that individual agents were only rarely in a position where they needed to help others’
vital interests. Second, the burden of helping persons’ other important needs, including
their psychological needs, would generally be evenly distributed among the agents able
to give help, which would mean that the burden on any individual agent would be unlikely
to be extremely demanding. The version of utilitarianism I have in mind would follow
Mill in holding that not all optimific actions should be construed as morally required,
and that moral obligations are generally linked only with important components of well-
being. Kantian contractualism, moreover, might, for reasons I have given, ground prin-
ciples according to which it is supererogatory for agents to make extensive personal sac-
rifices to save others’ vital interests, in circumstances in which individuals had a random
chance of ending up in a situation in which their vital interests are at stake (in contrast
to the present situation, in which the vital interests of the chronically poor are under
threat from the time they are born).
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IV. THE DEMANDINGNESS OF CONTRACTUALISM IN ANY
PRACTICALLY REALIZABLE STATE OF THE WORLD
Scanlon stipulates that the unlikelihood that a form of behavior will
cause harm does not diminish the complaint of the individuals who
actually end up being harmed: “The grounds for rejecting a principle
are based simply on the burdens it involves, for those who experience
them, without discounting them by the probability that there will be
anyone who actually does so” (p. 208). The kind of probability Scanlon
mentions in this passage is the probability that there is anyone at all
who will suffer a burden. He does not draw a distinction between cases
involving this kind of probability and cases in which it is certain that at
least one person will be harmed, but, because the harm will be inflicted
at random and affect only a small percentage of the population, the
probability for each individual that they will be the one who is harmed
is very remote; the example with which Scanlon illustrates his stipulation
appeals to the second kind of probability. If the low probability of being
harmed does not diminish the complaint of the person harmed in cases
of the first kind of probability as well as the second, this has even greater
ramifications for the demandingness of acceptable moral principles. I
will focus on the stipulation as applied only to cases of the second kind
and will argue that this alone has extreme implications.
Scanlon’s worry is that if the weight given to burdens is discounted
by the probability of suffering them, then even a serious burden might
be outweighed by relatively minor benefits to others, if the burden were
sufficiently unlikely. This would preclude the person who was burdened
from reasonably rejecting a principle allowing the risk of the burden
and so could lead to unacceptable trade-offs.
The kinds of cases Scanlon has in mind are ones in which those
at risk of being harmed by a form of behavior could not have expected
to benefit from it. If everyone stands to benefit from a form of behavior
that involves certain risks, then the behavior is acceptable to each in-
dividual from that individual’s personal point of view, and so no one
objects to it. This will be the case when the risk of harm is needed to
secure a public good, which is shared by everyone. An example of this
is a policy of allowing ambulances to break the speed limit, despite the
fact that this occasionally results in deaths from crashes that would not
otherwise have occurred. The number of people whose lives are saved
by the policy, by getting quicker access to lifesaving treatment, greatly
outweighs the number of people killed in the very rare car crashes that
result from the policy, and the benefit conferred by the policy of getting
quicker access to lifesaving treatment, should one need it, is shared by
everyone. The risk of harm is not imposed on some people for the sake
of benefits to a greater number of others but, rather, is imposed on
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everyone equally, because each person is much more likely to be ben-
efited than burdened by a principle that allows the risk. Therefore, each
person has reason to see herself as a potential beneficiary of the policy
and as one who must bear the remote risk of being harmed by the policy
in order to secure that benefit. The policy can therefore be justified
even to someone who ends up being harmed by it by dying in a car
crash.
The morally problematic cases are ones in which those burdened
by the risk of being severely harmed by a policy are excluded from being
potential beneficiaries of the policy. The risk of severe harm is imposed
on them not for the sake of a public good they themselves had reason
to recognize as important from their own standpoint but for the sake
of individually less important but more likely benefits to others.
The example Scanlon focuses on is of a “principle licensing us to
impose very severe hardships on a tiny minority of people, chosen at
random (by making them involuntary subjects of painful and dangerous
medical experiments, for example), in order to benefit a much larger
majority” (p. 208). This example is one in which those who end up
being harmed by acceptance of the principle could not have expected
to have been benefited by it. Scanlon emphasizes that the subjects are
involuntary and that the experiments are performed for the sake of the
majority. (We can contrast this with an alternative scenario, in which a
group of individuals suffers from a very serious disease, and all volunteer
to sign up for a scheme in which some of them will be selected for
experiments to test a drug for the disease. Signing up for the scheme
might increase the life expectancy of each of them. On this scheme,
even those who are selected could have expected to be benefited by
the scheme.)
Given that only a small fraction of the population would suffer the
harm, and that they would be randomly selected, the probability for
any one individual of being selected is very remote. Scanlon is concerned
to allow that a principle permitting the experiments “could reasonably
be rejected because of the severe burdens it involves” (pp. 208–9). How-
ever, he says, “this would be effectively ruled out” if “the weight given
to these burdens, as grounds for rejecting the principle,” were to be
“sharply discounted” because of the low probability of suffering the
burden (p. 209).
A contractualist rule utilitarian such as John Harsanyi might argue
that the medical experiments Scanlon describes are justifiable to each
person, even though those selected for the experiments are severely
burdened and could not have benefited from the experiments. Har-
sanyi’s argument would appeal to the fact that when individuals make
a rational self-interested choice from behind a veil of ignorance of what
position in society they will occupy, they will each choose the policies
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that will maximize their expected utility.22 The experiments can be jus-
tified to those who turn out to be burdened by them on the ground
that if they had not known whether or not they would suffer from the
disease, and whether or not they would be the ones selected for the
experiments, it would have been in their own rational self-interest to
have chosen the experiments. The reason this would have been a ra-
tional self-interested choice is because of the much greater probability
that they would have been benefited by the experiments, given that the
experiments impose a burden only on a few individuals and are for the
sake of a much larger majority.
Harsanyi shares the contractualist view that the fundamental jus-
tification of moral principles is that the principles are acceptable to
each person. Nevertheless, in claiming that the justifiability of principles
that impose a certain burden is based on the probabilities of the burdens
and benefits together with their magnitude, he introduces the inter-
personal aggregation of burdens and benefits, and justifies interpersonal
trade-offs for the sake of maximizing expected utility.
Scanlon, however, rejects this kind of reasoning, on the ground
that it distorts the nature of justification to individuals. He draws a sharp
distinction between “the question of what everyone could reasonably
agree to or what no one could reasonably reject” and “the question,
what would maximise the expectations of a single self-interested person
choosing in ignorance of his true position”; the latter, he says, “is a quite
different question.”23 On Scanlon’s view, a principle that everyone could
reasonably agree to or no one could reasonably reject is one that is
relevantly acceptable to each individual from that individual’s own stand-
point. Most important, a principle that imposes a burden on certain
individuals must be acceptable to those individuals who actually end up
suffering the burden. The worry with the contractualist rule utilitarian
account of justification is that it might maximize someone’s expected
utility to choose a policy which imposed a severe burden on a few
individuals and benefited a much larger number—if the probability of
ending up as one of the people burdened by the policy were sufficiently
low and the probability of ending up as someone benefited by it were
sufficiently high—even if actually suffering the burden would not be
acceptable to that individual from his or her own standpoint.
In Scanlon’s medical experiments example, from the standpoint of
those who actually end up being selected, their burden is not diminished
22. See, e.g., John Harsanyi, “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior,” in
Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1982), pp. 39–62.
23. Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Sen
and Williams, pp. 103–28, p. 122.
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by the fact that they were unlikely to have been chosen. And since they
were excluded from being potential beneficiaries of the policy, they had
no reason, from their own standpoint, to have accepted that they must
potentially bear such a burden. These individuals therefore have a very
strong objection to the policy, based on the actual burden it imposes
on them. (The reason it might have maximized their expected utility
to choose the policy from behind the veil of ignorance was because of
the greater likelihood that they would have ended up in the much larger
group of individuals who stood to benefit from the policy.)
Thus, the stipulation that the low probability of being burdened
by a principle does not diminish the complaint of the person who ends
up suffering that burden, in cases in which that person could not have
expected to benefit from the principle, is central to ensuring that a
principle is relevantly acceptable from each individual’s standpoint. It
is not enough to show that it would have maximized each individual’s
expected utility to choose the risk of the burden; we have to ask directly
whether the burden is acceptable from the standpoint of the person
who actually suffers it. As Scanlon puts it, justification to others “gives
us a direct reason to be concerned with other people’s points of view:
not because we might, for all we know, actually be them, or because we
might occupy their position in some other possible world, but in order
to find principles that they, as well as we, have reason to accept” (p.
191).24
The issue can be brought out by considering Sophia Reibetanz’s
discussion of a case in which one hundred peasants are tilling a field
which contains an unexploded mine.25 If the mine is not removed, one
of them will certainly suffer the loss of a limb. There is only one person
able to operate a device that could remove the mine, and, given the
weather conditions, if he does remove the mine, he will certainly catch
pneumonia. Since each peasant has only a one in a hundred chance of
hitting the mine, the expected disutility for each of them, if the mine
is not removed, is plausibly outweighed by the certain harm of catching
pneumonia. However, as Reibetanz argues, if our central concern is to
24. Rawls too is concerned to avoid allowing that the low probability of ending up
being burdened could play a role in justifying the burden. He stipulates that from behind
the veil of ignorance individuals will avoid engaging in such probability calculations but
will instead use a play-safe strategy, according to which they will avoid any risk of ending
up in a position they find unacceptable by ensuring that the position of even the worst-
off member of society is acceptable to that individual from his or her own standpoint.
Scanlon, however, rejects the whole model of self-interested choice from behind a veil of
ignorance as failing to capture the core of contractualist justification of principles, which
consists in showing that the burdens are justifiable to the individuals who suffer them
from those individuals’ own standpoints.
25. Sophia Reibetanz, “Contractualism and Aggregation,” Ethics 108 (1998): 296–311.
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justify the relevant principle to each person burdened by it, the im-
portant factor is that we know that someone will suffer the considerable
burden of the loss of a limb. The appeal to each peasant’s expected
utility fails to justify the loss of limb to the particular individual who
ends up suffering that burden, whoever that individual turns out to be.
There is, however, a serious problem with Scanlon’s stipulation that
the remoteness of the probability of being burdened does not diminish
the complaint of the person who actually suffers the burden, in cases
in which those burdened by the principle were not also potential ben-
eficiaries of it. The problem is that this stipulation has some drastic
implications. As Scanlon points out, it seems to imply that behavior that
involves a very remote risk of harm is just as objectionable as behavior
that is certain to cause harm, since the burden of actually suffering the
harm is the same in each case; as Scanlon says, “the harm is just as bad
when suffered ‘by accident’ as when it is inflicted” (p. 209).
Avoiding all behavior that involved any risk of harm, however re-
mote, to those who did not stand to be benefited by the form of behavior
would be extremely burdensome. For example, as Scanlon mentions,
personal air travel would seem to be prohibited, because of the remote
risk that some people are killed by falling planes. When considering
the acceptability of general principles, we need to consider their long-
term effects, over persons’ lifetimes. Although, if we consider any one
plane journey in isolation, it is exceedingly unlikely that anyone on the
ground will be killed, we know that the activity of plane travel will every
so many years result in the death of one or more persons on the ground.
Moreover, we can assume that, unlike those who were on board the
plane, some of those killed from falling planes could not have expected
to benefit from the activity of personal air travel because, for example,
they were too poor to travel by plane. We can therefore assume that at
least one person in each generation somewhere in the world will die
from the activity of personal air travel who could not have expected to
have been benefited by it. If these individuals’ complaints are not di-
minished by the low probability of suffering the harm, then they must
be based on the actual cost of death, in just the same way as if the
activity had been certain to kill them.
Scanlon wants to avoid the highly counterintuitive implication that
air travel is impermissible, along with many other activities that involve
the remote risk of harm. He thinks he can show that air travel is allowed
without conceding that the low probability of being harmed diminishes
the complaint of the person harmed. That is because this low probability
is relevant as a factor that affects the burden of avoiding causing the
harm: “The probability that a form of conduct will cause harm can be
relevant not as a factor diminishing the ‘complaint’ of the affected
parties (discounting the harm by the likelihood of their suffering it)
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but rather as an indicator of the care that the agent has to take to avoid
causing harm” (p. 209).
However, this solution to the problem does not give Scanlon suf-
ficient grounds to justify the judgments he wants to make. He claims
that a principle that required that every possible precaution against the
risk of harm be taken would be so burdensome on those taking the
precautions that such a principle could be reasonably rejected: it would,
he argues, “be too confining, and could reasonably be rejected on that
ground” (p. 209). He says that a ban on air travel could, for example,
reasonably be rejected, despite the risk that some people are killed by
falling planes, because of the severe restriction such a principle would
impose.
But if the remoteness of the risk of being killed does not reduce
the complaint of the person unlucky enough to end up being killed,
then in deciding whether a principle permitting air travel can reasonably
be rejected, we need to compare the burden of not being allowed to
travel by air with the burden of actually being killed. And the burden
of being killed outweighs the burden of forgoing air travel. This can be
seen by considering a hypothetical example in which we knew that if
we continued traveling by air we would be certain to die prematurely
in an air crash. Under these circumstances, however confining we found
giving up air travel, we would be very unlikely to choose to continue
air travel, since we would most probably judge the burden of actual
premature death to be greater than the burden of severely restricting
our travel.
On Scanlon’s account of reasonable rejection, therefore, the re-
mote risk of death to one individual outweighs the burden to any other
single individual of forgoing air travel. It follows that if we make a one-
by-one comparison between the individual most burdened by the activity
and the individual most burdened by a ban on it, the first person’s
complaint is stronger. And given that there is no interpersonal aggre-
gation of complaints, the number of persons who would have to forgo
air travel does not strengthen the complaint over a ban on air travel.
This means that the complaint at the exceedingly remote risk of death
outweighs the complaint over a ban on air travel. A principle imposing
such a ban therefore cannot be reasonably rejected.
The comparative strength of the complaints involved in the air
travel case, when it is stipulated that the probability of the harm does
not diminish the complaint of the person harmed, can be generalized.
A great many of our activities involve a remote risk of causing death.
For many of them it can be plausibly assumed that each person can
expect to benefit from them. However, for many other activities, not all
of those who face the remote risk of being killed by the activity could
have expected to benefit from it.
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Forgoing all activities of the second kind could significantly im-
poverish agents’ lives. However, as long as their lives would still be well
worth living, then the cost to each of them of the extensive burden of
avoiding the risk would be less than the cost to another individual of
actually being killed by the activity. Therefore, measures which reduced
the extremely remote risk of death to a few individuals would be justified
even if they severely impoverished the lives of millions. (Moreover, as
Scanlon originally formulates his stipulation about probability, the im-
plications are even more extreme: even in cases in which it is uncertain
whether anyone at all will suffer the harm, the complaint over the risk
of harm is not diminished by the low probability of suffering it.)
Scanlon takes it to be an advantage of his contractualism that it
can accommodate our intuitions about cases such as that of the medical
experiments and preclude the kinds of trade-offs that utilitarianism
would permit. One important aspect of his precluding such trade-offs
and, hence, distinguishing his view from Harsanyi’s veil-of-ignorance
rule utilitarianism, is his stipulation that the low probability of suffering
a burden does not diminish the complaint of the person who suffers
it. However, given the highly counterintuitive implications of Scanlon’s
stipulation, I suggest that Scanlon is wrong to claim that what leads
utilitarianism to impose unacceptable burdens is that it allows inter-
personal aggregation of benefits and burdens per se. Rather, what is
wrong with the versions of utilitarianism he criticizes in his book is the
kind of aggregation they allow.
One serious objection to the version of utilitarianism that allows
the problematic trade-off of Jones’s being given extremely painful elec-
trical shocks so as not to interrupt the transmission of the football match
watched by millions is that it is committed to cardinal measurements
of benefits and burdens. These measurements are totted up to arrive
at the net sum total. On this cardinal model of utility measurement,
any burden, however serious, could be outweighed by a relatively trivial
benefit to a sufficiently large number of others.
As James Griffin argues, however, on a plausible account of inter-
personal (and intrapersonal) welfare aggregation there are many cases
in which there is discontinuity in value between different persons’ ben-
efits and burdens, such that the disvalue of one person’s suffering a
certain serious burden (such as severe and prolonged physical pain, or
being precluded from living a good life) will outweigh any amount of
a certain kind of trivial benefit or burden.26 The Jones case would be
an instance of such discontinuity in value, so that no number of persons
experiencing the pleasure of watching the football match could out-
weigh the burden of Jones’s extreme pain. In cases in which there is
26. James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), pp. 85–89.
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this discontinuity of value, only ordinal measurements are possible. How-
ever, as Griffin argues, ordinal rankings are sufficient to enable welfare
maximization. Furthermore, many utilitarians, including Mill, have em-
braced ordinal rankings in cases in which the benefits and burdens can
be claimed to be different in kind.
There may, however, be a further problem with certain trade-offs,
which no version of utilitarianism is in a position to accommodate,
whatever its conception of welfare aggregation and maximization. Even
when the burdens faced by all the parties are comparably serious, certain
trade-offs may be unacceptable purely because they are disrespectful.
The reason the medical experiments case seems particularly troubling,
I suggest, is because of the erosion of the barriers of respect that would
be involved in the state’s deliberately choosing to inflict a serious harm
on people against their will. This is a worry that Scanlon’s contrac-
tualism, founded as it is in the importance of a relationship of mutual
recognition, is in a particularly strong position to capture.
However, in contexts in which no one is being deliberately selected
for a certain fate, and all the burdens are comparably serious, we do
tend to think that the number of people who would be benefited and
burdened is morally relevant. We do, for example, tend to think that
an activity can be morally acceptable even if a few persons are randomly
killed by it, who could not have expected to benefit from it, provided
there are significant, even though smaller, benefits to a huge number
of others. The reason we think that air travel, for example, is permissible,
I suggest, is because the number of those killed by it who did not stand
to benefit from it is so small, and a ban on it would impose a significant
(though smaller) burden on a huge number.
The contractualist moral point of view, which is strictly confined to
considering individuals’ viewpoints one by one, can allow no aggregation
of any kind. As a result, for the reasons I have discussed, it will remain
extremely demanding in any practically realizable state of the world.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I suggest that the assumption that contractualism pro-
vides a less demanding alternative to utilitarianism should be reconsid-
ered. Utilitarianism imposes extremely demanding obligations to help
those in need, and this has often been taken to be a stumbling block
for it. However, I have shown that utilitarianism’s main impartial rival,
Kantian contractualism, also imposes extremely demanding obligations
to help those in need, obligations that are not substantially less de-
manding than those imposed by utilitarianism. This suggests that it may
not be possible to ground any significantly less demanding obligations
without giving up impartiality, which I take it that no acceptable account
of morality can afford to do.
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In short, I do not think that a theory can be faulted for implying
that our obligations to help those in need in the current state of the
world are extremely demanding. However, Scanlon’s contractualism is
also demanding in a way that is much less defensible because of the
fact that it rejects all interpersonal trade-offs. This rejection commits
Scanlon’s theory to extremely demanding principles for any situation
in which any one person may be harmed by activities which involve any
small risk, and that is the situation in any practically realizable state of
the world.
